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 I. INTRODUCTION 
There is an increasing demand for network devices capable of 
examining the content of data packets in order to improve 
network security and provide application-specific services. 
Deep packet inspection (DPI) is widely used in intrusion 
detection systems for deterring, detecting and deflecting 
malicious attacks over the network. Nearly all intrusion 
detection systems have the ability to search through packets and 
identify contents that match with known attacks.   
There are a wide variety of attacks. Thus each packet needs to 
be matched against thousands of attack signatures. For example, 
the SNORT network intrusion detection system (NIDS) has 
9182 rules as of October 2008, each contains attack signatures. 
SNORT is a popular open-source intrusion detection system, 
with millions of downloads to date [1]. It can be configured to 
perform protocol analysis and content searching and matching 
on real-time traffic to detect a variety of worms, attacks and 
probes. 
The goal of the Linux L7-filter [2] is to detect the application 
layer protocols. Currently, the Linux L7-filter contains 111 
application protocol signatures, contributed by researchers and 
developers world-wide.  
Bloom filters have recently become popular within the 
networking community because they are suitable for high-speed 
implementations besides enabling novel algorithmic solutions 
to key networking problems, such as packet forwarding, traffic 
measurements and security checking. The primary use of a 
standard Bloom filter is for determining set membership: does 
an element x belong to a given set S? Its probabilistic nature 
makes it produce false positives; that is, it may declare that x
belongs to S even when this is not the case.  
In this paper, we propose a scalable bloom filter based 
prefilter and a hardware-oriented predispatcher. The key 
features of this mechanism are: 
? The introduction of four sliding windows corresponding to 
4 bloom filters whose string lengths are most frequently 
occur. 
? It is suitable for hardware implementation on FPGAs and 
ASICs. 
? A general procedure for training prefilter engine to make it 
become more and more robust. 
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II. METHODOLOGY
A. Snort prefilter and sliding windows 
Snort works by matching traffic patterns to its rules, stored in 
a rule set. The captured packets are passed through a packet 
decoder, which determines which protocol is in use for a given 
packet and matches the payload data against allowable behavior 
for patterns of that protocol. 
The content keyword is one of the important features of Snort. 
It allows the user to set rules that search for specific content in 
the packet payload and trigger response based on that data.  
By extracting those unique content keywords from snort rule 
set, we can get string length distribution in figure1. 
Figure 1 String length distribution in snort V2.8.4. 
Dharmapurikar et al. proposed a hardware architecture based 
on parallel Bloom filters for network packet inspection [3]. In 
order to perform the input streaming detection, the original 
architecture is designed to use multiple Bloom filters each of 
which detects strings of a unique length [4]. However, the more 
Bloom Filters we use the more processing time and resource it 
takes. To reduce the number of Bloom Filters, four sliding 
windows are constructed to process the continuous input 
streams and flows by the 4 popular string lengths of these rules. 
Thereafter only 4-byte BF, 7-byte BF, 36-byte BF and 180-byte 
BF will be constructed. To make efficient use of Bloom filters, 
strings are clustered with different lengths in a group, and 
strings are truncated to the length of the shortest string in the 
group. For instance, all the string length more than 7 but less 
than 36 will be truncated to 7 from the beginning of each string. 
Specially, content fields of less than 4 bytes will be rewritten to 
get rid of its ambiguous character. Furthermore, one special 
small test engine is added to detect the length which is less than 
4 bytes in simple rules. 
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B. L7-filter predispatcher and hardware implementation
Differently, L7-filter rule set does not have as many rules as 
Snort, so that it is unnecessary to use advanced data structures 
like bloom filter. There are only 111 rules in the newest version 
L7-filter according to the statistics released in Dec 2008 [2]. 
Nevertheless, the rules would be still extracted to some simple 
string manually or automatically from complicated regex which 
can be divided into three types according to different situations. 
1. Simple rules  
There are 88 rules start with ‘^’ while 21 rules do not start 
with ‘^’ but followed by simple strings. It means that the 
majority number of rules can be extracted to fixed contents. As 
an example, consider rule poco: /^\x80\x94\x0a\x01....\x1f\x9e
/, which will be extracted to “\x80\x94\x0a\x01” and “\x1f\x9e” 
obviously. Nearly 80% of L7-filter rule set can be processed via 
this method. 
2. Special rules 
As is shown in Figure 2, pattern skypeout matches any packet 
payload that starts with hexadecimal letter ‘\x01’ (\x02, \x03 
etc.), followed by eight or fewer arbitrary characters, and finally 
the same character at the beginning. 
It will generate 5610 states in NFA or 4584 states in DFA. 
Obviously, generated DFA in traditional approaches will 
consume huge storage. Contrarily, it will be significantly 
simplified if implemented by a routine in hardware logic. The 
meaning for this rule is that if the first character of an input 
stream appears again within the distance of ten characters from 
the first character, the input stream will be reported to be 
matched by this rule. In fact, only one register plus one counter 
are needed to record the first character of an input stream and to 
check if any one of the following ten characters is equal to the 
first character recorded in the register. The routine will set the 
hit flag to true if there is a match. Otherwise, the routine will 
stop checking the current input stream and wait for the next 
input stream.   
Figure 2 DFA generated with pattern skypeout
3. Complicated rules  
As another example, consider rule imesh. The imesh rule is 
split into four segments by “|”. The routine will report a match 
when any one of the four segments is matched by the input 
stream. The starting positions of the four segments are the same, 
which begin from the first character of an input stream. The first 
segment will be matched if the first four characters of an input 
stream are “post”, followed by K (K>=0) characters belonging 
to [\x09-\x0d-~], followed by “<PasswordHash>”, eliminating 
a certain number of characters, and followed by 
“</PasswordHash><ClientVer>”. The other three segments are 
handled similarly by the corresponding routines. These routine 
are executed in parallel and report a match of the imesh rule 
occurred separately. 
Taking advantage of these three types of rule sets, we present 
the following predispatcher engine. When the first packet is 
approaching, we send it to the fixed-contents rule sets which 
consist of Simple rules and Complicated rules first. If matched, 
this packet will be pushed to the corresponding candidate-rules 
to do accurate matching. Simultaneously, this packet will be 
sent to the Special rule sets without using predispatcher engine. 
Predispatcher reduces the number of possible matching rules 
through extracting specific content fields, reducing the numbers 
of exact matching operations as well as the energy 
consumption. 
C. Scalablity 
This prefilter engine could filter 22.8% unmalicious data. To 
analyze the factors that influence the filtering ratio, we record 
matched keywords during the process. Some simple characters, 
such as, ‘a’ and ‘u’ are found in the recorded result file. This is 
because multiple content fields exist in some rules, such as the 
backdoor in snort V2.8.4. These multiple content keywords, 
like: content: “from|3A|”, content: “a” have significant 
influence on the filtering ratio. By rewriting or refining these 
rules, we could get an agreeable filtering ratio of approximate 
62.5% of unmalicious data. 
To make this architecture robust, we can train it via adjusting 
the settings of bloom filter. We know that the filtering ratio will 
be different for different input data. Then some bad traffic that 
has been detected previously can be used to train our prefilter 
engine. We can also mix malicious part with normal trace to 
make this training. 
III. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
We presented a scalable bloom filter based prefilter and a 
hardware-oriented predispatcher pattern matching mechanism 
for content filtering applications, which are scalable in terms of 
speed, the number of patterns and the pattern length. Our 
prefilter algorithm is based on a memory efficient multi-hashing 
data structure called Bloom filter. 
According to the statistics of our simulations, the filter ratio 
can reach up to 60% if the whole engine has been trained well.  
It has been showed that this engine could enhance the 
capabilities of general-purpose IDS solutions. 
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